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Abstract—The EPCglobal network is a computer network
which allows supply chain companies to search for their unknown
partners globally and share information stored in product RFID
tags with each other. Although there have been quite a number of
recent research works done to improve the security of EPCglobal
Network, the existing access control solutions are not efficient and
scalable. For instance, when a user queries Electronic Product
Code Information Service (EPCIS) for EPC event information,
the EPCIS would have to query the Electronic Product Code
Discovery Service (EPCDS) to check the access rights of the user.
This implementation is not efficient and creates a bottleneck at
EPCDS. In this paper, we design and propose a digital signature
scheme, SignEPC, as a more efficient and scalable access control
solution for EPCglobal network. Our paper will also evaluate
SignEPC by considering the various possible attacks that could
be done on our proposed model.
Index Terms—Design, Security, RFID, EPCGlobal Network
I. INTRODUCTION
A supply chain is a complex process which consists of
a number of companies, such as suppliers, manufacturers,
wholesales, distributors, retailers etc., working together to
transform raw materials into products that can be consumed by
consumers. Very often, the companies in a supply chain will
have to collaborate and share information on their products so
as to ensure that the right amount of products can be delivered
to the consumers at the right places and in the right time.
To achieve effectiveness and efficient in sharing of product
information, EPCglobal network [3] was proposed to allow
companies in a supply chain to search for their unknown
partners globally and share their product information.
Since the conception of EPCglobal network, researchers had
proposed a number of privacy and access control features to
improve the security of the network [9]. However most of the
existing access control solutions are inefficient and not scalable
for real-world implementation. For example, in a simple
Secure Electronic Product Code Discovery Service (EPCDS)
model setup, the Electronic Product Code Information Service
(EPCIS) will have to query EPCDS to check if the user has
the access rights to the EPC event information requested.
This is not efficient and scalable as it creates a bottleneck at
EPCDS when the number of EPCIS and queries increases. In
this paper, we design and propose a digital signature scheme,
SignEPC, as a more efficient and scalable access control
solution for EPCglobal network. We will also evaluate and
demonstrate that SignEPC is able to prevent possible attacks
effectively. The implementation and management of SignEPC
will also be discussed in detail.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
background information on EPCglobal Network and some of
the related works done to improve the security of the network.
Section III introduces SignEPC, the proposed digital signature
scheme. Details on the implementation and management of
SignEPC will also be discussed in this section. The analysis
on how SignEPC prevents various possible attacks as well as
the performance and scalability of SignEPC will be discussed
in Section IV. Lastly, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
In this session we briefly introduce the EPCglobal Network
architecture and some of the common EPCDS models. Some
of the existing access control solutions in the Secure EPCDS
Model will also be discussed in this section.
A. EPCglobal Network
In EPCglobal Network, the products in a supply chain are
attached with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags,
which contain EPC numbers that are globally identifiable.
When a supply chain company receives products with RFID
tags that contain EPC numbers, it stores the received products’
EPC numbers in the repositories at company’s website using
EPCIS. Besides the EPC numbers, the company may also store
EPC event information such as the time and location of the
tag being read as well as other business related information.
Companies may publish their service addresses or URLs to
EPCDS. The EPCDS will act as a search engine and directory
for supply chain companies to search for related partners as
well as information about certain products [6].
B. EPCDS Models
A discovery service design or EPCDS model illustrates the
interaction between the querying user, EPCDS and EPCIS
[5]. Figure 1 shows the common EPCDS models, namely
Directory Service Model, Query Relay model, aggregating
model and most recently, Secure EPCDS Model which was
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Fig. 1: EPCDS Models
proposed to enhance privacy and access control of information
in EPCglobal Network.
In the Directory Service Model, a user query the EPCDS
with desired EPC number and the EPCDS returns the URLs of
the related companies that handle product with the EPC num-
ber. The user then query the EPCIS of the related companies
using the received URLs and the EPCIS return the EPC event
information to the user. The returns of the URLs by EPCDS
indicates ownership of the product information in that EPCIS
companies. As such, every user knows exactly which EPC
numbers are being handled by which EPCIS companies. This
is a problem because many companies which consider their
possession of items as confidential or sensitive information,
do not want to expose their EPCIS URLs and were reluctant
to publish them to EPCDS [1].
In a Query Relay Model, the EPCDS does not return the
URLs of the related companies. Instead, the EPCDS will
redirect the queries from the user to the related companies
and the EPCIS will return the relevant EPC event information
to the user directly.
The Aggregating Model is similar to the query relay model.
Instead of returning the relevant EPC event information di-
rectly to the querying user, EPCIS will return the result
to EPCDS and the EPCDS will aggregate the result before
returning it to the user.
The Secure EPCDS Model is an enhanced version of the
Directory Service Model. To tackle problem of leaking sensi-
tive business information mentioned earlier in the Directory
Service Model, the Secure EPCDS Model enforced access
control policies in both EPCIS and EPCDS. For example,
when a user query the EPCDS with a certain EPC number,
the EPCDS will check the access rights of the querying user
against the access control policies published by the EPCIS.
If the querying user is authorized to access the EPC event
information, the EPCDS will return the EPCIS URL to the
user else it will return an error. Similarly, when a user query
EPCIS using the received URL, EPCIS will query EPCDS to
ensure that the querying user has the access rights to the EPC
event information before returning results to the querying user.
Although this simple access control mechanism is effective in
ensuring that EPCIS URLs of companies as well as the EPC
event information are not leaked to unauthorized parties, it
creates a bottleneck at EPCDS as all access control queries
are being channeled to it.
C. Access Control in Secure EPCDS Model
F. Benjamina and G. Oliver [1] had highlighted many
security challenges of EPCglobal Network. Since then many
researchers have proposed different access control solutions
to enhance the security of the network. The first simple
access control policy in Secure EPCDS Model was proposed
by J. Worapot et al. [11]. In that work, J. Worapot et al.
suggested X.509 certificate as a authentication solution and
three authorization rules: “All”, which allow everyone to query
and access the EPC event information, “Limited”, which only
allows companies that own the same EPC number can access
the EPC event information and hidden, and “’Hide’ which the
event information is not shared with anybody.
F. Kerschbaum [4] proposed more complex access control
policies with the Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC)
model. He also suggested the visibility attribute for authoriza-
tion, which is based on the partnership relationship between
companies in the supply chain. There are basically three types
of visibility attributes; “Up-Stream”, where a company’s EPC
event information is made accessible to partners who published
the same EPC number in EPCDS before the company, “Down-
Stream”, where a company’s EPC event information is made
accessible to partners who published the same EPC number
in EPCDS after the company, and “Whole-Stream”, where the
event information is made accessible to any partners who had
published the same EPC number in EPCDS. J. Shi et al. [10]
had also extended the works and proposed adding subject
attributes such as company ID and object attributes such as
EPC numbers for authorization rules.
Using the above mentioned authentication and authorization
rules, companies can define access control policies to better
manage their EPC event information. For example, a man-
ufacturing company may decide that a certain EPC number
should only be made accessible to distributors and retailers
by enforcing “Down-Stream” visibility attribute as its access
control policies. Similar implementations can be done for up-
stream and whole-stream partners in the supply chain.
III. COMPONENTS IN SIGNEPC
In this section we first introduce digital signature before
describing the the implementation of our proposed solution,
SignEPC. Implementation issues such as distribution of key
and update of access policies will also be discussed and
addressed in later part of this section.
A. Digital Signature
A digital signature is a mathematical scheme allow users
to ensures that an electronic document is authentic. A valid
digital signature have two properties: authenticity, where the
digital signature gives a recipient reason to believe that the
message was genuinely created by a known sender, and non-
repudiation, where the sender cannot deny that he or she have
sent the message.
The notion of a digital signature scheme was first con-
ceived by W. Diffie and M. Hellman [2]. R. Rivest et al.
[8] subsequently invented the RSA algorithm, a public key
cryptosystem which uses a pair of asymmetric keys. The RSA
algorithm was also used to implement the first practical and
usable digital signature scheme. Since then, digital signature
was widely used in software distribution and financial sector
to prevent forgery.
The RSA signature scheme uses a pair of asymmetric
keys; the private key, which is keep secret by the user and
use to create a digital signature, and the public key which
is distributed to other users to verify the digital signature.
The asymmetric keys are related mathematically, however the
parameters are chosen such that calculating the private key
from the public key is computationally infeasible. The RSA
public and private keys are also used in a way that satisfy
the two digital signature scheme property; authenticity, when
sender’s private key is used to sign off a message so that the
recipient believe that the message is genuinely from the sender,
and non-repudiation when the sender is the only one with the
private key and thus cannot deny that he or she have sent the
message. The RSA signature scheme will be used in SignEPC.
B. SignEPC Model
In our proposed solution, SignEPC will leverage the prop-
erties of a digital signature scheme to solve the EPCDS
bottleneck problem mentioned earlier. Figure 2 shows the
process where EPCDS generates a signature tag S using its
RSA private key. The user first sends his query on a certain
EPC number to EPCDS. The EPCDS checks if the user has
the rights to access the EPC event information. Note that
the access rights can be a simple concatenation of the EPC
number and EPCIS url for user to access the full EPC event
information or a more complex and fine grain access rights
to specific EPC event information. For example, a EPCIS
might grant a specific group of users to rights to access the
warehouse where the product with the EPC number is stored
but not the quality information. If the user has the access
rights, EPCDS will pass the user ID, access rights and expiry
into a hash function to generate a message digest M, i.e. M
= Hash(userid,rights,expiry). The expiry is a datetime derived
from the duration defined by EPCDS where a signature tag
will remain valid. This duration is also being made known
to EPCIS for signature verification. EPCDS then signs on the
message digest using its private key d to generate a signature
tag S, i.e. S=signd(M). Finally, the EPCDS returns the URL,
user’s access rights, signature tag S to the querying user.
Fig. 2: EPCDS Sign on Access Rights
Fig. 3: EPCIS Verify Access Rights
Figure 3 shows the signature verification process performed
by EPCIS. The EPCIS first receives the query, user access
rights and signature tag S from the querying user. Assuming
that the EPCDS defined expiry duration of a signature is set to
daily, i.e. the validity of a signature tag is till 2359H of the day
it is issued, the EPCIS will pass the querying user ID, received
access rights and today’s date into a hash function to generate
message digest G, i.e. G = Hash(userid,rights,todaydate).
EPCIS then verifies the signature tag S by generating a
message digest M’ using the EPCDS public key e, i.e. M’
= verifye(S). If M’ = G, EPCIS can be sure that the message
digest sent from the querying user is not being tampered with
and EPCIS verifies that the user has the access right to the
EPC event information. Finally, the EPCIS return the EPC
event information to the querying user.
With the above described mechanism, the SignEPC model
allows EPCIS to verify the access rights of the querying user
without having to query the EPCDS, thus solving the access
right bottleneck problem.
C. Distribution of Keys
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is an arrange-
ment that binds public key to an unique user by the means of a
certificate authority (CA), is commonly used in the distribution
of public keys over the web [7]. In the context of SignEPC,
we assume that the EPCDS is an trusted entity and it can
assume the role of CA. The EPCDS can publish and make
available its public key to all users and the EPCIS can verify if
a public key belong to EPCDS by issuing a challenge message
to the EPCDS. Refer to Figure 4 for the EPCDS public key
verification.
Fig. 4: Verify EPCDS Public Key
The EPCIS may also schedule routine checks on the expiry
of the current EPCDS public key and renew it accordingly.
With the EPCDS public key verified, EPCIS can leverage on
the SignEPC model to verify the access rights of the querying
users.
D. Updates on Access Policies
The SignEPC model is also able to handle changes in access
policies efficiently. Consider the scenario where the EPCIS
publishes a change in its access policies for a certain EPC
number to EPCDS, and the new access policies invalidate the
access for a user. The user with expired access rights may
attempt to query the EPCIS using the past EPCDS issued tag.
This scenario is however prevented by expiry date feature
of SignEPC; if the user attempt to use past EPCDS issued tag
and the date of query is after the expiry date of the issued tag,
EPCIS will reject the use query and not return any results. An
assumption made in this scenario is that the generated tag has
expired when the user made the query, if the generate tag has
not expired and the access rights for the user has changed,
the user could still succeed in querying the EPCIS using the
past EPCDS issue tag. It is thus important to keep the expiry
window of the EPCDS issue tag small or time the update on
access policies close to the signature tag expiry date so that
most of the past EPCDS issued tags would be expired as soon
as possible.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SIGNEPC
In this section, we analyse SignEPC in a two aspects.
Firstly, we analyze whether the solution will be able to prevent
possible attacks that could be done on SignEPC. Next we
evaluate the performance and scalability of our solution in
comparison to the the Secure EPCDS model design.
A. Attacking SignEPC model
Manipulating Access Rights. Figure 5 shows a simple
obvious attack, where an attacker could try to change the
access rights received from EPCDS and send it to the EPCIS.
In this scenario, the EPCIS will generate a message digest
G using the attacker’s user ID, received access rights and
today’s date. EPCIS then verifies the received signature tag
S using EPCDS public key to generate a message digest M’,
the generated message digest G will not match the message
digest M’, i.e.G 6= M’. This is because the tampered access
rights was not signed by EPCDS. This thus triggers an alarm
and the EPCIS will return an error to the attacker.
Fig. 5: Attacker Manipulate Access Rights
Replay Attack. The attacker may also attempt more ad-
vance attacks such as the replay attack. Figure 6 shows the
anatomy of a replay attack on the Secure EPCDS Model. A
user first query the EPCDS with a certain EPC number and
the EPCDS verifies the user against the access control policies
and returns the URL to EPCIS if the user has the access right
to the EPC event information. An attacker then intercepts the
return URL from the EPCDS query of a legitimate user and
replay the URL to query EPCIS for EPC event information.
A simple way to counter the replay attack is to have the EP-
CIS verify the access control rights of the querying user with
EPCDS and this is implement in the Secure EPCDS Model.
However in this approach, the access control bottleneck at
EPCDS still persist.
The SignEPC model will be able to tackle replay attack
using the signature verification mechanism. When an attacker
Fig. 6: Replay Attack on Secure EPCDS Model
attempts an replay attack on the EPCIS by replaying the query
of a legitimate user, he would also have to send the access
rights and signature tag of the legitimate user to EPCIS.
Fig. 7: Attacker Replay Query to SignEPC
Figure 7 shows the SignEPC signature verification mecha-
nism preventing the replay attack. The EPCIS first pass the
user ID, received access rights and today’s date into a hash
function to generate message digest, G = Hash(userid, rights,
todaydate). EPCIS then verifies the signature tag S to generate
a message digest M’ using the EPCDS public key e, i.e. M’
= verifye(S). In this scenario, the different user ID inputted in
the hash function will result in a different message digest, thus
G will not match the verified message digest M’, i.e. G 6= M’.
This will trigger an alarm and return an error to the attacker.
An assumption made in the above scenario is that the
attacker is not able to impersonate the legitimate user but only
forwards a legitimate query to EPCIS, i.e. the attacker must
send his user ID to EPCIS or the user is already authenticated
using another authentication mechanism. In business context,
we assume that the attacker is a legitimate and authenticated
partner but he does not have the access to the queried EPC
event information, thus the EPCIS is able to authenticate
the attacker even though the attacker does not have the
authorization to the EPC event information.
B. Performance and Scalability
We analyze performance in two cases - Firstly we compare
the time taken by EPCDS to return the URLs to the querying
user. Secondly, we compare the time taken by the EPCIS to
check if the querying user is authorized to retrieve the EPC
event information.
In the first case, EPCDS in the SignEPC model will take
longer time to return the results to the querying user because
after validating the user has the access rights, it has to generate
a tag that vouch for the user access rights using EPCDS private
key. The original Secure EPCDS model will be relatively faster
because EPCDS will simply return the URLs to the querying
user after the user is verified to have the access rights.
In the second case, EPCIS in the Secure EPCDS Model
will have to query EPCDS to check if the user is authorized
to retrieve the EPC event information. In the SignEPC model,
EPCIS will not need to query the EPCDS again to check for
access rights, instead it will verify the access rights of the
querying user using the EPCDS public key. Is it not obviously
clear which model takes a shorter time to verify the querying
user access rights. However as the number of EPCIS increases,
a bottleneck is created at EPCDS in the Secure EPCDS Model
due to the increase in access control queries. In this scale-up
scenario, the Secure EPCDS Model could take longer time
in verifying the access rights of the querying user than the
SignEPC model. Thus the elimination of the access right
bottleneck at EPCDS makes SignEPC more scalable than the
Secure EPCDS Model.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In summary, we have designed and proposed SignPEC,
a digital signature scheme for access control solution for
EPCglobal network. We have considered the possible attacks
that could be done on SignEPC and demonstrate how SignEPC
can prevent these attacks effectively. We have also evaluated
the performance and scalability of SignEPC, and shown that
SignEPC model would outperform Secure EPCDS Model as
the number of EPCIS increases. For future works, we will
like to explore applying the RSA public key cyptosystem to
enhance other security aspects of EPCglobal network. For
example we can further improve the security of SignEPC by
exploring the use of RSA public key cyptosystem to create
a new authentication mechanism that prevent attackers from
impersonating legitimate users.
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